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Three cognitive mechanisms for knowledge tracking
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 November 2021
Abstract
We welcome Phillips et al.'s proposal to separate the understanding of “knowledge” from that of “beliefs.” We argue that this distinction is best specified at the level of the cognitive mechanisms. Three distinct mechanisms are discussed: tagging one's own representations with those who share the same reality; representing others' representations (metarepresenting knowledge); and attributing dispositions to provide useful information.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
Knowledge before belief
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