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Some theoretical and practical implications of defining aptitude and reasoning in terms of each other

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 April 2001

Adam S. Goodie  and
Cristina C. Williams
Adam S. Goodie
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602-3013 {goodie; williams}@egon.psy.uga.edu http://teach.psy.uga.edu/Dept/Faculty/Goodie.stm
Cristina C. Williams
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602-3013 {goodie; williams}@egon.psy.uga.edu http://teach.psy.uga.edu/Dept/Faculty/Goodie.stm
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Abstract

Stanovich & West continue a history of norm-setting that began with deference to reasonable people's opinions, followed by adherence to probability theorems. They return to deference to reasonable people, with aptitude test performance substituting for reasonableness. This allows them to select independently among competing theories, but defines reasoning circularly in terms of aptitude, while aptitude is measured using reasoning.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 23 , Issue 5 , October 2000 , pp. 675 - 676
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press

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