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Semantic paralysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2003

Fred Adams
Fred Adams*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716 http://www.udel.edu/Philosophy/famain.html
*
[email protected]
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Abstract:

I challenge Jackendoff's claim that semantics should not be paralyzed by a failure to solve Brentano's problem of intentionality. I argue that his account of semantics is in fact paralyzed because it fails to live up to his own standards of naturalization, has no account of falsity, and gives the wrong semantic objects for words and thoughts.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 6 , December 2003 , pp. 666 - 667
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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References

Note

1. Editor's note: “f-mind” stands for “functional mind” (Cf. Foundations, p. 21).

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