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The role of (bounded) optimization in theory testing and prediction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 January 2019
Abstract
We argue that a radically increased emphasis on (bounded) optimality can contribute to cognitive science by supporting prediction. Bounded optimality (computational rationality), an idea that borrowed from artificial intelligence, supports a priori behavioral prediction from constrained generative models of cognition. Bounded optimality thereby addresses serious failings with the logic and testing of descriptive models of perception and action.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018
References
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Target article
Suboptimality in perceptual decision making
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