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The restorative logic of punishment: Another argument in favor of weak selection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2012

Nicolas Baumard
Nicolas Baumard
Affiliation:
Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Program, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104. [email protected]://sites.google.com/site/nicolasbaumard/Home
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Abstract

Strong reciprocity theorists claim that punishment has evolved to promote the good of the group and to deter cheating. By contrast, weak reciprocity suggests that punishment aims to restore justice (i.e., reciprocity) between the criminal and his victim. Experimental evidences as well as field observations suggest that humans punish criminals to restore fairness rather than to support group cooperation.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , February 2012 , pp. 17 - 18
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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