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Redressing the emperor in causal clothing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 September 2022

Victor J. Btesh ,
Neil R. Bramley  and
David A. Lagnado
Victor J. Btesh
Affiliation:
Experimental Psychology Department, University College London, London WC1H 0AP, [email protected] [email protected]://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/david_lagnado.html
Neil R. Bramley
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EC8 9JZ, UK [email protected]://www.bramleylab.ppls.ed.ac.uk/
David A. Lagnado
Affiliation:
Experimental Psychology Department, University College London, London WC1H 0AP, [email protected] [email protected]://www.ucl.ac.uk/lagnado-lab/david_lagnado.html
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Abstract

Over-flexibility in the definition of Friston blankets obscures a key distinction between observational and interventional inference. The latter requires cognizers form not just a causal representation of the world but also of their own boundary and relationship with it, in order to diagnose the consequences of their actions. We suggest this locates the blanket in the eye of the beholder.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e188
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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