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Reciprocity and uncertainty

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2012

Yoella Bereby-Meyer
Yoella Bereby-Meyer
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva 84105, Israel. [email protected]
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Abstract

Guala points to a discrepancy between strong negative reciprocity observed in the lab and the way cooperation is sustained “in the wild.” This commentary suggests that in lab experiments, strong negative reciprocity is limited when uncertainty exists regarding the players' actions and the intentions. Thus, costly punishment is indeed a limited mechanism for sustaining cooperation in an uncertain environment.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , February 2012 , pp. 18 - 19
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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