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Protesting too much: Self-deception and self-signaling

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2011

Ryan McKay ,
Danica Mijović-Prelec  and
Dražen Prelec
Ryan McKay
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham TW20 0EX, United Kingdom. [email protected]://homepage.mac.com/ryantmckay/
Danica Mijović-Prelec
Affiliation:
Sloan School and Neuroeconomics Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139. [email protected]
Dražen Prelec
Affiliation:
Sloan School and Neuroeconomics Center, Department of Economics, and Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139. [email protected]
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Abstract

Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) propose that self-deception has evolved to facilitate the deception of others. However, they ignore the subjective moral costs of deception and the crucial issue of credibility in self-deceptive speech. A self-signaling interpretation can account for the ritualistic quality of some self-deceptive affirmations and for the often-noted gap between what self-deceivers say and what they truly believe.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , February 2011 , pp. 34 - 35
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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