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Private speech, cognitive-computational control, and the autism-psychosis continuum

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 June 2008

William Frawley
William Frawley
Affiliation:
Center for Applied Linguistics, Washington, DC 20016. [email protected]
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Abstract

Autism and psychosis manifest private speech disruptions analogous to their diametrical opposition along the autism-psychosis continuum. Autism has naturally suppressed private speech with predictable structural deficits when it does surface; psychosis has overt but ineffectual private speech with similar structural deficits. These private speech oppositions are best understood in the context of the control processes of cognitive-computational architectures.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 31 , Issue 3 , June 2008 , pp. 269 - 270
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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