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Phenomenality without access?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

William G. Lycan
William G. Lycan
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125. [email protected]://www.unc.edu/~ujanel
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Abstract

Block holds that there can be “phenomenology,” “awareness,” and even awareness of the phenomenology, without cognitive access by the subject. The subject may have an experience and be aware of the experience, yet neither notice it nor attend to it. How that is possible is far from clear. I invite Block to explain this very fine distinction.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 515 - 516
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

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