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Phenomenal consciousness lite: No thanks!

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

J. Kevin O'Regan  and
Erik Myin
J. Kevin O'Regan
Affiliation:
Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, CNRS – Université Paris Descartes, Centre Biomédical des Saints Pères, 75270 Paris cedex 06, France
Erik Myin
Affiliation:
Centre for Philosophical Psychology, Department of Philosophy, Universiteit Antwerpen, 2000 Antwerpen, Belgium. [email protected]://[email protected]://www.ua.ac.be/erik.myin
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Abstract

The target article appeals to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal. The article also considerably weakens Block's original distinction between a truly nonfunctional phenomenal consciousness and a functional access consciousness. The new form of phenomenal consciousness seems to be a poor-man's cognitive access.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 520 - 521
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

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