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Overselling the case against normativism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 October 2011
Abstract
Though we are in broad agreement with much of Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) position, we criticize two aspects of their argument. First, rejecting normativism is unlikely to yield the benefits that E&E seek. Second, their conception of rational norms is overly restrictive and, as a consequence, their arguments at most challenge a relatively restrictive version of normativism.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011
References
Stein, E. (1996) Without good reason: The rationality debate in philosophy and cognitive science. Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
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Overselling the case against normativism
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