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The ontology of aspectual shape
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 February 2010
Abstract
Searle (1990) argues that unconscious intrinsic intentional states must be accessible to consciousness because (1) all intrinsic intentional states have aspectual shape, the “ontology” of which cannot be explained in a third-person (e.g., neurophysiological) vocabulary, and (2) ontologically, unconscious mental states are neurophysiological processes. This argument confuses three senses of “ontology,” namely, factuality, individuative properties, and phenomenological presence.
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- Information
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 18 , Special Issue 3: An International Journal of Current Research and Theory with Open Peer Commentary , September 1995 , pp. 612 - 614
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995