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Omissions, conflations, and false dichotomies: Conceptual and empirical problems with the Barbey & Sloman account

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

Gary L. Brase
Gary L. Brase
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506-5302. [email protected]
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Abstract

Both the theoretical frameworks that organize the first part of Barbey & Sloman's (B&S's) target article and the empirical evidence marshaled in the second part are marked by distinctions that should not exist (i.e., false dichotomies), conflations where distinctions should be made, and selective omissions of empirical results – within the very studies discussed – that create illusions of theoretical and empirical favor.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , June 2007 , pp. 258 - 259
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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