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Normative theory in decision making and moral reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Natalie Gold ,
Andrew M. Colman  and
Briony D. Pulford
Natalie Gold
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, Scotland, United Kingdom. [email protected]://homepages.ed.ac.uk/ngold
Andrew M. Colman
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Leicester, Leicester LE1 7RH, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/psychology/ppl/[email protected]://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/psychology/ppl/staff/bdp5
Briony D. Pulford
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Leicester, Leicester LE1 7RH, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/psychology/ppl/[email protected]://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/psychology/ppl/staff/bdp5
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Abstract

Normative theories can be useful in developing descriptive theories, as when normative subjective expected utility theory is used to develop descriptive rational choice theory and behavioral game theory. “Ought” questions are also the essence of theories of moral reasoning, a domain of higher mental processing that could not survive without normative considerations.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 2011 , pp. 256 - 257
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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