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The (mis)management of agency: Conscious belief and nonconscious self-control

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 January 2010

Brandon Randolph-Seng
Brandon Randolph-Seng
Affiliation:
Texas Tech University, Rawls College of Business, Area of Management, Lubbock, TX 79409-2101. [email protected]/brandolp
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Abstract

McKay & Dennett (M&D) identify positive illusions as fulfilling the criteria for an adaptive misbelief, but could there be other types of beliefs that may qualify as adaptive misbeliefs? My commentary addresses this and other questions through identifying belief in free will as a potential candidate as an adaptive misbelief.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 6 , December 2009 , pp. 532 - 533
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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