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Mental models: The revised theory brings new problems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2011

David Hardman
David Hardman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, City University, Northhampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, United Kingdom, [email protected]
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Abstract

The new notation for mental-models theory proposed by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991; 1993) makes predictions that are inconsistent with those made previously by those authors. Notably, two frequently observed reasoning fallacies are not predicted by the theory. Moreover, the assumption made in the domain of syllogistic reasoning, that arbitrary numbers of individuals are used to represent premises, is also shown to cause problems for the prediction of problem difficulty.

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 19 , Special Issue 3 , September 1996 , pp. 542 - 543
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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