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Let us not put the probabilistic cart before the uncertainty bull

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Guy Politzer  and
Jean-François Bonnefon
Guy Politzer
Affiliation:
Institut Jean Nicod, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Ecole Normale Supérieure, 75005 Paris, [email protected]://www.institutnicod.org/notices.php?user=Politzertop
Jean-François Bonnefon
Affiliation:
Cognition, Langue, Langages, Ergonomie (CLLE), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Université de Toulouse, 31058 Toulouse, Cedex 9, France. [email protected]://w3.univ-tlse2.fr/ltc/bonnefon
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Abstract

Although we endorse the primacy of uncertainty in reasoning, we argue that a probabilistic framework cannot model the fundamental skill of proof administration. Furthermore, we are skeptical about the assumption that standard probability calculus is the appropriate formalism to represent human uncertainty. There are other models up to this task, so let us not repeat the excesses of the past.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , February 2009 , pp. 100 - 101
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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