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Knowledge-by-acquaintance before propositional knowledge/belief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Michael Tomasello Open the ORCID record for Michael Tomasello [Opens in a new window]
Michael Tomasello*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, [email protected]
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Abstract

More basic than the authors' distinction between knowing and believing is a distinction between knowledge-by-acquaintance (I know John Smith) and propositional knowledge/belief (I know/believe that John Smith lives in Durham). This distinction provides a better account of both the comparative and developmental data.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e173
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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