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Intrinsic changes in experience: Swift and enormous

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1999

Daniel C. Dennett
Daniel C. Dennett
Affiliation:
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155 [email protected] ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/mainpage.htm
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Abstract

Because, as Palmer shows, the only kinds of differences that can be detected are differences in relational structure, and relational structure is precisely what is preserved by isomorphism, his own arguments can be used to expose the incoherent motivation behind the traditional idea of “intrinsic qualities” of experience.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 6 , December 1999 , pp. 951
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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