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How necessary is the unconscious as a predictive, explanatory, or prescriptive construct?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2014

Claudia González-Vallejo ,
Thomas R. Stewart ,
G. Daniel Lassiter  and
Justin M. Weindhardt
Claudia González-Vallejo
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701. [email protected]@[email protected]://www.ohioupsychology.com/
Thomas R. Stewart
Affiliation:
Center for Policy Research and Department of Public Administration and Policy, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy, State University of New York at Albany, Albany, NY 12222. [email protected]://www.albany.edu/cpr/
G. Daniel Lassiter
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701. [email protected]@[email protected]://www.ohioupsychology.com/
Justin M. Weindhardt
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701. [email protected]@[email protected]://www.ohioupsychology.com/
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Abstract

We elucidate the epistemological futility of using concepts such as unconscious thinking in research. Focusing on Newell & Shanks' (N&S's) use of the lens model as a framework, we clarify issues with regard to unconscious-thought theory (UTT) and self-insight studies. We examine these key points: Brunswikian psychology is absent in UTT; research on self-insight did not emerge to explore the unconscious; the accuracy of judgments does not necessitate the unconscious; and the prescriptive claim of UTT is unfounded.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , February 2014 , pp. 28
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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