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How do we get from propositions to behavior?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Daniel A. Sternberg  and
James L. McClelland
Daniel A. Sternberg
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA [email protected]
James L. McClelland
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and the Center for Mind, Brain, and Computation, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. [email protected]://psych.stanford.edu/~jlm
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Abstract

Mitchell et al. describe many fascinating studies, and in the process, propose what they consider to be a unified framework for human learning in which effortful, controlled learning results in propositional knowledge. However, it is unclear how any of their findings privilege a propositional account, and we remain concerned that embedding all knowledge in propositional representations obscures the tight interdependence between learning from experiences and the use of the results of learning as a basis for action.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 226 - 227
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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