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Exchanging humpty dumpties is not a solution: Why a representational view of knowledge must be replaced with an action-based approach
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 November 2021
Abstract
In arguing for knowledge representation before belief, Phillips et al. presuppose a representational theory of knowledge, a view that has been extensively criticized. As an alternative, we propose an action-based approach to knowledge, conceptualized in terms of skill. We outline the implications of this approach for children's developing social understanding, beginning with sensorimotor interaction and extending to the verbal level.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
Knowledge before belief
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Author response
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