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The evolutionary route to self-deception: Why offensive versus defensive strategy might be a false alternative

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2011

Ulrich Frey  and
Eckart Voland
Ulrich Frey
Affiliation:
Zentrum für Philosophie und Grundlagen der Wissenschaft, Universität Giessen, D-35394 Giessen, Germany. [email protected]://www.uni-giessen.de/cms/fbz/zentren/philosophie/ZfP/wiss_mitarbeiter/[email protected]://www.uni-giessen.de/cms/fbz/zentren/philosophie/ZfP/biophil
Eckart Voland
Affiliation:
Zentrum für Philosophie und Grundlagen der Wissenschaft, Universität Giessen, D-35394 Giessen, Germany. [email protected]://www.uni-giessen.de/cms/fbz/zentren/philosophie/ZfP/wiss_mitarbeiter/[email protected]://www.uni-giessen.de/cms/fbz/zentren/philosophie/ZfP/biophil
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Abstract

Self-deception may be the result of social manipulation and conflict management of social in-groups. Although self-deception certainly has offensive and defensive aspects, a full evolutionary understanding of this phenomenon is not possible until strategies of other parties are included into a model of self-perception and self-representation.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , February 2011 , pp. 21 - 22
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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