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The evolution of knowledge during the Cambrian explosion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Walter Veit Open the ORCID record for Walter Veit [Opens in a new window]
Walter Veit*
Affiliation:
School of History and Philosophy of Science, The University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW2006, Australia. [email protected]; https://walterveit.com/
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Abstract

Phillips et al. make a compelling case for a reversal in the current paradigm in “other minds” research by considering the representation of other people's knowledge more basic than the attribution of belief. Unfortunately, they only discuss primates. In this commentary, I argue that the representation of others' knowledge is an evolutionary ancient trait, first appearing during the Cambrian explosion.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e174
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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