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Evidence from convergent evolution and causal reasoning suggests that conclusions on human uniqueness may be premature

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 June 2012

Alex H. Taylor  and
Nicola S. Clayton
Alex H. Taylor
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, United Kingdom. [email protected] Department of Psychology, University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand. [email protected]
Nicola S. Clayton
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, United Kingdom. [email protected]
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Abstract

We agree with Vaesen that there is evidence for cognitive differences between humans and other primates. However, it is too early to draw firm conclusions about the uniqueness of the cognitive mechanisms underlying human tool use. Tests of causal understanding are in their infancy, as is the study of animals more distantly related to humans.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 4 , August 2012 , pp. 241 - 242
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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