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Ecologically structured information: The power of pictures and other effective data presentations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

Wolfgang Gaissmaier ,
Nils Straubinger  and
David C. Funder
Wolfgang Gaissmaier
Affiliation:
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, [email protected]/users/gaissmaierstraubinger@mpib-berlin.mpg.dewww.abc.mpib-berlin.mpg.de./users/straubinger
Nils Straubinger
Affiliation:
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, [email protected]/users/gaissmaierstraubinger@mpib-berlin.mpg.dewww.abc.mpib-berlin.mpg.de./users/straubinger
David C. Funder
Affiliation:
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, [email protected]/users/gaissmaierstraubinger@mpib-berlin.mpg.dewww.abc.mpib-berlin.mpg.de./users/straubinger Department of Psychology, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521. [email protected]
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Abstract

The general principle behind the effects of nested sets on the use of base rates, we believe, is that the mind is prepared to take in “ecologically structured information.” Without any need to assume two cognitive systems, this principle explains how the proper use of base rates can be facilitated and also accounts for occasions when base rates are overused.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , June 2007 , pp. 263 - 264
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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