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Dr. Pangloss knows best

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2011

Daniel C. Dennett
Daniel C. Dennett
Affiliation:
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 13 , Issue 3 , September 1990 , pp. 581 - 582
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1990

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