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Do framing effects debunk moral beliefs?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2019

Kelsey McDonald Open the ORCID record for Kelsey McDonald [Opens in a new window] ,
Siyuan Yin ,
Tara Weese  and
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong Open the ORCID record for Walter Sinnott-Armstrong [Opens in a new window]
Kelsey McDonald
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708. [email protected]@[email protected]@duke.eduhttps://sites.duke.edu/wsa/
Siyuan Yin
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708. [email protected]@[email protected]@duke.eduhttps://sites.duke.edu/wsa/
Tara Weese
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708. [email protected]@[email protected]@duke.eduhttps://sites.duke.edu/wsa/
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708. [email protected]@[email protected]@duke.eduhttps://sites.duke.edu/wsa/
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Abstract

May argues that framing effects do not undermine moral beliefs, because they affect only a minority of moral judgments in small ways. We criticize his estimates of the extent of framing effects on moral judgments, and then we argue that framing effects would cause trouble for moral judgments even if his estimates were correct.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e162
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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