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Concept modeling, essential properties, and similarity spaces

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 December 2002

Peter Gärdenfors
Peter Gärdenfors
Affiliation:
Lund University Cognitive Science, Kunghuset, S-222 22 Lund, [email protected] http://www.lucs.lu.se
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Abstract

Bloom argues that concepts depend on psychological essentialism. He rejects the proposal that concepts are based on perceptual similarity spaces because it cannot account for how we handle new properties and does not fit with our intuitions about essences. I argue that by using a broader notion of similarity space, it is possible to explain these features of concepts.

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 24 , Issue 6 , December 2001 , pp. 1105 - 1106
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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