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Choice blindness and the non-unitary nature of the human mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2011

Petter Johansson ,
Lars Hall  and
Peter Gärdenfors
Petter Johansson
Affiliation:
Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.lucs.lu.se/petter.johansson/
Lars Hall
Affiliation:
Lund University Cognitive Science, Lund University, [email protected]://www.lucs.lu.se/lars.hall/[email protected]://www.lucs.lu.se/peter.gardenfors
Peter Gärdenfors
Affiliation:
Lund University Cognitive Science, Lund University, [email protected]://www.lucs.lu.se/lars.hall/[email protected]://www.lucs.lu.se/peter.gardenfors
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Abstract

Experiments on choice blindness support von Hippel & Trivers's (VH&T's) conception of the mind as fundamentally divided, but they also highlight a problem for VH&T's idea of non-conscious self-deception: If I try to trick you into believing that I have a certain preference, and the best way is to also trick myself, I might actually end up having that preference, at all levels of processing.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , February 2011 , pp. 28 - 29
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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