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Beliefs, intentions, and evolution: Old versus new psychological game theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 October 2003

Jeffrey P. Carpenter  and
Peter Hans Matthews
Jeffrey P. Carpenter*
Affiliation:
Economics Department, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT05753http://community.middlebury.edu/~jcarpent/http://community.middlebury.edu/~pmatthew/
Peter Hans Matthews*
Affiliation:
Economics Department, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT05753http://community.middlebury.edu/~jcarpent/http://community.middlebury.edu/~pmatthew/
*
[email protected]
[email protected]
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Abstract:

We compare Colman's proposed “psychological game theory” with the existing literature on psychological games (Geanakoplos et al. 1989), in which beliefs and intentions assume a prominent role. We also discuss experimental evidence on intentions, with a particular emphasis on reciprocal behavior, as well as recent efforts to show that such behavior is consistent with social evolution.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , April 2003 , pp. 158 - 159
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003

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