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Belief in God and in strong government as accidental cognitive by-products

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2011

Peter Kramer  and
Paola Bressan
Peter Kramer
Affiliation:
Dipartimento di Psicologia Generale, Università di Padova, 35131 Padova, Italy. [email protected]/[email protected]/~pbressan
Paola Bressan
Affiliation:
Dipartimento di Psicologia Generale, Università di Padova, 35131 Padova, Italy. [email protected]/[email protected]/~pbressan
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Abstract

Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) interpret belief in God and belief in strong government as the outcome of an active process of self-deception on a worldwide scale. We propose, instead, that these beliefs might simply be a passive spin-off of efficient cognitive processes.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , February 2011 , pp. 31 - 32
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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