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Belief in evolved belief systems: Artifact of a limited evolutionary model?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 January 2010

Tyler J. Wereha  and
Timothy P. Racine
Tyler J. Wereha
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada. [email protected]@sfu.ca
Timothy P. Racine
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada. [email protected]@sfu.ca
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Abstract

Belief in evolved belief systems stems from using a population-genetic model of evolution that misconstrues the developmental relationship between genes and behaviour, confuses notions of “adapted” and “adaptive,” and ignores the fundamental role of language in the development of human beliefs. We suggest that theories about the evolution of belief would be better grounded in a developmental model of evolution.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 6 , December 2009 , pp. 537 - 538
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

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