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After the fall: Religious capacities and the error theory of morality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 June 2005

Michael Stingl*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Alberta, T1K 3M4, Canadahttp://www.uleth.ca/phl/
John Collier*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Programme, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 4041, South Africahttp://www.nu.ac.za/undphil/collier

Abstract:

The target article proposes an error theory for religious belief. In contrast, moral beliefs are typically not counterintuitive, and some moral cognition and motivation is functional. Error theories for moral belief try to reduce morality to nonmoral psychological capacities because objective moral beliefs seem too fragile in a competitive environment. An error theory for religious belief makes this unnecessary.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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