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Adaptive diversity and misbelief1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 January 2010

Edward T. Cokely  and
Adam Feltz
Edward T. Cokely
Affiliation:
Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, 14195 Berlin, Germany. [email protected]
Adam Feltz
Affiliation:
Departments of Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies, Schreiner University, CMB 6208, Kerrville, TX 78028. [email protected]://faculty.schreiner.edu/adfeltz/Lab/adam_feltz.html
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Abstract

Although it makes some progress, McKay & Dennett's (M&D's) proposal is limited because (1) the argument for adaptive misbelief is not new, (2) arguments overextend the evidence provided, and (3) the alleged sufficient conditions are not as prohibitive as suggested. We offer alternative perspectives and evidence, including individual differences research, indicating that adaptive misbeliefs are likely much more widespread than implied.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 6 , December 2009 , pp. 516
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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