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Why not LF for false belief reasoning?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 August 2003

Jill G. de Villiers  and
Peter A. de Villiers
Jill G. de Villiers
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, Smith College, Clark Science Center, Northampton, MA 01063 [email protected]@smith.edu
Peter A. de Villiers
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, Smith College, Clark Science Center, Northampton, MA 01063 [email protected]@smith.edu
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Abstract

We argue that natural language has the right degree of representational richness for false belief reasoning, especially the complements under verbs of communication and belief. Language may indeed be necessary synchronically for cross-modular reasoning, but certain achievements in language seem necessary at least diachronically for explicit reasoning about false beliefs.

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 25 , Issue 6 , December 2002 , pp. 682 - 683
Copyright
© 2002 Cambridge University Press

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