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What might dynamical intentionality be, if not computation?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1998

Ronald L. Chrisley
Ronald L. Chrisley
Affiliation:
School of Cognitive Computing Sciences, University of Sussex, Falmer BN1 9QH, United [email protected] www.cogs.susx.ac.uk/users/ronc
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Abstract

(1) Van Gelder's concession that the dynamical hypothesis is not in opposition to computation in general does not agree well with his anticomputational stance. (2) There are problems with the claim that dynamic systems allow for nonrepresentational aspects of computation in a way in which digital computation cannot. (3) There are two senses of the “cognition is computation” claim and van Gelder argues against only one of them. (4) Dynamical systems as characterized in the target article share problems of universal realizability with formal notions of computation, but differ in that there is no solution available for them. (5) The dynamical hypothesis cannot tell us what cognition is, because instantiating a particular dynamical system is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a cognitive agent.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 5 , October 1998 , pp. 634 - 635
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

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