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Teleological perception without a biological perceiver?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 June 2005

Théophile Ohlmann*
Affiliation:
Laboratoire de Psychologie et de Neurocognition, UMR CNRS 5105, 38040Grenoble CEDEX 9, France
Bernard Amblard*
Affiliation:
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Laboratoire de Développement et Pathologie du Mouvement, 13402 Marseille CEDEX 20, France
Brice Isableu*
Affiliation:
Centre de Recherche en Sciences du Sport, UPRES 1609, Division STAPS, Université Paris Sud-XI, 91 405 Orsay CEDEX, Batiment 335, France

Abstract:

Strong between- and within-animal differences during spatial activities lead us to claim that a given animal is directly sensitive to a given substructure of the global array. This vicarious subset is not cut out by the senses but by redundancies emerging from physical properties. We argue that the subset is not a single ambient array, or a combination of single ambient arrays, but a complex holistic part of the global array.

Type
Continuing Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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Footnotes

Commentary onT. A. Stoffregen & B. G. Bardy (2001). On specification and the senses. BBS 24(2):195–261.