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The standard Bayesian model is normatively invalid for biological brains

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 January 2019

Rani Moran Open the ORCID record for Rani Moran [Opens in a new window]  and
Konstantinos Tsetsos Open the ORCID record for Konstantinos Tsetsos [Opens in a new window]
Rani Moran
Affiliation:
Max Planck UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, University College London, London WC1B 5EH, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.mps-ucl-centre.mpg.de/en/people/rani-moran Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, United Kingdom
Konstantinos Tsetsos
Affiliation:
Department of Neurophysiology and Pathophysiology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, 20246 Hamburg, Germany. [email protected]://sites.google.com/site/konstantinostsetsos/
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Abstract

We show that the benchmark Bayesian framework that Rahnev & Denison (R&D) used to assess optimality is actually suboptimal under realistic assumptions about how noise corrupts decision making in biological brains. This model is therefore invalid qua normative standard. We advise against generally forsaking optimality and argue that a biologically constrained definition of optimality could serve as an important driver for scientific progress.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e237
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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