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Sensory holism and functionalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1999

Joseph Thomas Tolliver
Joseph Thomas Tolliver
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 [email protected] w3.arizona.edu/~phil/faculty.html
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Abstract

I defend the possibility of a functional account of the intrinsic qualities of sensory experience against the claim that functional characterization can only describe such qualities to the level of isomorphism of relational structures on those qualities. A form sensory holism might be true concerning the phenomenal, and this holism would account for some antifunctionalist intuition evoked by inverted spectrum and absent qualia arguments. Sensory holism is compatible with the correctness of functionalism about the phenomenal.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 6 , December 1999 , pp. 972 - 973
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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