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Satisficing as an alternative to optimality and suboptimality in perceptual decision making

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 January 2019

Antonio Mastrogiorgio Open the ORCID record for Antonio Mastrogiorgio [Opens in a new window]  and
Enrico Petracca Open the ORCID record for Enrico Petracca [Opens in a new window]
Antonio Mastrogiorgio
Affiliation:
Department of Neurosciences, Imaging and Clinical Sciences & CeSI-MeT, University of Chieti-Pescara, 66100 Chieti Scalo (CH), Italy. [email protected]
Enrico Petracca
Affiliation:
Department of Economics (IRENE), University of Neuchâtel, 2000 Neuchâtel, Switzerland School of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Bologna, 40126 Bologna, Italy. [email protected]://sites.google.com/site/embodiedrationality/
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Abstract

Rahnev & Denison's (R&D) critique of optimality in perceptual decision making leads either to implicitly retaining optimality as a normative benchmark or disregarding the normative approach altogether. We suggest that “bounded rationality,” and particularly the “satisficing” criterion, would help dispense with optimality while salvaging normativity. We also suggest that satisficing would provide a parsimonious and robust explanation for perceptual behavior.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e235
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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