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Reuniting (scene) phenomenology with (scene) access

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

David Papineau
David Papineau
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, King's College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.kcl.ac.uk/kis/schools/hums/philosophy/staff/d_papineau.html
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Abstract

Block shows that we can consciously see a scene without being able to identify all the individual items in it. But in itself this fails to drive a wedge between phenomenology and access. Once we distinguish scene phenomenology from item phenomenology, the link between phenomenology and access is restored.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 521
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

Papineau, D. (2002) Thinking about consciousness. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sperling, G. (1960) The information available in brief visual presentations. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied 74(11, Whole No. 498):1–29. [Whole issue.]CrossRefGoogle Scholar