Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jn8rn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-22T14:13:28.269Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Reasons to act and the mental representation of consequentialist aberrations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2008

Jean-François Bonnefon
Affiliation:
CLLE, CNRS, and Université de Toulouse, Maison de la Recherche, 31058 Toulouse Cedex 9, France. [email protected]://w3.univ-tlse2.fr/ltc/bonnefon/

Abstract

If imagination is guided by the same principles as rational thoughts, then we ought not to stop at the way people make inferences to get insights about the workings of imagination; we ought to consider as well the way they make rational choices. This broader approach accounts for the puzzling effect of reasons to act on the mutability of actions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Baron, J. (1988/2000) Thinking and deciding, 3rd edition. Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1988.)Google Scholar
Bonnefon, J. F. & Hilton, D. J. (2004) Consequential conditionals: Invited and suppressed inferences from valued outcomes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 30:2837.Google ScholarPubMed
Bonnefon, J. F., Zhang, J. & Deng, C. (2007) Is the effect of justifications on regret direct or indirect? Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale – International Review of Social Psychology 20:131–45.Google Scholar
Byrne, R. M. J. (2005) The rational imagination: How people create alternatives to reality. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evans, J. St. B. T. & Over, D. E. (1996) Rationality and reasoning. Psychology Press.Google Scholar