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Psychology supports independence of phenomenal consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Tyler Burge
Tyler Burge
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90024. [email protected]
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Abstract

Inference-to-best-explanation from psychological evidence supports the view that phenomenal consciousness in perceptual exposures occurs before limited aspects of that consciousness are retained in working memory. Independently of specific neurological theory, psychological considerations indicate that machinery producing phenomenal consciousness is independent of machinery producing working memory, hence independent of access to higher cognitive capacities.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 500 - 501
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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