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Overlooking metacognitive experience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Joëlle Proust
Joëlle Proust
Affiliation:
Department of Cognitive Studies, Ecole Normale Supérieure, and Institut Jean-Nicod, EHESS and ENS, 75005 Paris, France. [email protected]://joelleproust.hautetfort.com
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Abstract

Peter Carruthers correctly claims that metacognition in humans may involve self-directed interpretations (i.e., may use the conceptual interpretative resources of mindreading). He fails to show, however, that metacognition cannot rely exclusively on subjective experience. Focusing on self-directed mindreading can only bypass evolutionary considerations and obscure important functional differences.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 158 - 159
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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