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Our evolving beliefs about evolved misbelief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 January 2010

Ryan T. McKay  and
Daniel C. Dennett
Ryan T. McKay
Affiliation:
Centre for Anthropology and Mind, University of Oxford, Oxford OX2 6PE, United Kingdom. [email protected]://homepage.mac.com/ryantmckay/
Daniel C. Dennett
Affiliation:
The Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155-7059. [email protected]://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/incbios/dennettd/dennettd.htm
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Abstract

The commentaries raise a host of challenging issues and reflect a broad range of views. Some commentators doubt that there is any convincing evidence for adaptive misbelief, and remain (in our view, unduly) wedded to our “default presumption” that misbelief is maladaptive. Others think that the evidence for adaptive misbelief is so obvious, and so widespread, that the label “default presumption” is disingenuous. We try to chart a careful course between these opposing perspectives.

Type
Authors' Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 6 , December 2009 , pp. 541 - 561
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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