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On the relation between counterfactual and causal reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2008

Barbara A. Spellman  and
Dieynaba G. Ndiaye
Barbara A. Spellman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904-4400. [email protected] [email protected]://people.virginia.edu/~bas6g/
Dieynaba G. Ndiaye
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904-4400. [email protected] [email protected]://people.virginia.edu/~bas6g/
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Abstract

We critique the distinction Byrne makes between strong causes and enabling conditions, and its implications, on both theoretical and empirical grounds. First, we believe that the difference is psychological, not logical. Second, we disagree that there is a strict “dichotomy between the focus of counterfactual and causal thoughts.” Third, we disagree that it is easier for people to generate causes than counterfactuals.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 466 - 467
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

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