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The nontrivial doctrine of cognitive neuroscience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Valerie Gray Hardcastle
Valerie Gray Hardcastle
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0126, and Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0374 [email protected]
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Abstract

Gold & Stoljar's “trivial” neuron doctrine is neither a truism in cognitive science nor trivial; it has serious consequences for the future direction of the mind/brain sciences. Not everyone would agree that these consequences are desirable. The authors' “radical” doctrine is not so radical; their division between cognitive neuroscience and neurobiology is largely artificial. Indeed, there is no sharp distinction between cognitive neuroscience and other areas of the brain sciences.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 5 , October 1999 , pp. 839
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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