Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-lnqnp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-03T18:58:46.597Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Moral realism and cross-cultural normative diversity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 December 2005

Edouard Machery ,
Daniel Kelly  and
Stephen P. Stich
Edouard Machery*
Affiliation:
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA15260http://www.pitt.edu/~machery/
Daniel Kelly*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ08901-2882
Stephen P. Stich*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ08901-2882http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/
*
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We discuss the implications of the findings reported in the target article for moral theory, and argue that they represent a clear and genuine case of fundamental moral disagreement. As such, the findings support a moderate form of moral anti-realism – the position that, for some moral issues, there is no fact of the matter about what is right and wrong.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 28 , Issue 6 , December 2005 , pp. 830
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)